

The Dynamics of the Executive and Legislative Relations in the Indonesian Constitutional System

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ABSTRACT

This study explores the dynamic relationship between the executive and legislative branches within Indonesia's constitutional system. Although formally based on the principle of separation of powers, the Indonesian political landscape is characterized by interdependence, negotiation, and compromise between the President and the House of Representatives (DPR). Through a qualitative approach using literature review and document analysis, the research highlights how coalition politics, oversight mechanisms, and political conflicts shape the nature of executive-legislative relations. Findings suggest that while theoretical models advocate institutional independence, practical governance in Indonesia relies heavily on collaboration and mutual adjustment. The study also discusses the implications of this interdependence for democratic accountability, policy-making efficiency, and institutional resilience. Ultimately, it argues that strengthening democratic institutions and encouraging political dialogue are essential for maintaining effective governance in a diverse and decentralized society like Indonesia.

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INTRODUCTION

In the Indonesian constitutional system, the relationship between the executive and legislative branches plays an important role in the governance and policymaking processes. Indonesia adopts a presidential system of government, where the President holds executive power, while the legislature consists of the DPR (People's Representative Council) and the DPD (Regional Representative Council). Both institutions have clear roles, but the interaction between them is often dynamic, particularly regarding the division of power and the achievement of public policy. Although the theory of this governmental system separates executive and legislative powers, in practice, these two branches must coordinate with each other and sometimes face sharp disagreements (Sudirman, 2019).

In the context of constitutional theory, the separation of powers proposed by Montesquieu in *The Spirit of the Laws* is a fundamental principle for modern governance systems. Montesquieu argued that to prevent tyranny, power should be divided into three independent branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. However, in practice, this system leans more toward a balanced separation of powers between the executive and legislative, rather than complete isolation. In this regard, the President, as both the head of state and government, plays a key role in policymaking, but the DPR, as the legislative body, also plays a vital role in oversight and lawmaking (Widodo, 2021).

One factor that distinguishes the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in Indonesia is the existence of political coalitions. In Indonesia, the multi-party system forces political parties to form coalitions after elections to support the government. This creates a more complex relationship between the President and the DPR, as policies taken by the President often rely on the legislative support within these coalitions. For example, policies such as the ratification of the Omnibus Law reflect how these two branches often compromise to achieve common goals, even though this sometimes leads to debates and political tensions (Kartikasari, 2020).

Furthermore, the DPR's role in overseeing the executive is crucial in maintaining the balance of power. The DPR has the right to oversee government operations, including managing the budget and other policies taken by the President. This oversight is part of the checks and balances mechanism, which aims to prevent the abuse of power by the executive. For example, in discussions of the state budget or in overseeing policies related to the welfare of the people, the DPR has the right to ask questions, conduct investigations, or even invoke its rights to inquiry if deemed necessary. This demonstrates that although the President holds significant executive power, the legislature still plays an essential role in controlling the direction of government (Pramudya, 2019).

Conflicts of interest between the President and the DPR often arise, particularly when it comes to issues that require in-depth policymaking, such as economic, social, and political policies that directly affect the lives of the people. For instance, in the matter of regional autonomy, the President and the DPR often have differing perspectives on the allocation of funds or regional authority, which can sometimes cause tensions in decision-making. This is also related to efforts to balance national and local interests, which continue to evolve as regional needs become more pressing (Ardiansyah, 2020).

The principle of separation of powers proposed by Montesquieu, while highly influential, is not strictly applied in Indonesia's constitutional system. In this system, although there is a clear division of authority between the executive and legislative branches, these two institutions still depend on and collaborate with each other in many aspects of governance, including lawmaking and policymaking. This dynamic creates a more flexible interaction between the President and the DPR, where both branches strive to balance their respective powers through compromise and political dialogue (Baharuddin, 2021).

Considering these dynamics, it is essential to further explore how the relationship between the executive and legislative branches contributes to policymaking and government oversight in Indonesia. This article will further examine how these two branches interact, the challenges they face in reaching political agreements, and how this influences policymaking processes and effective governance. Through this study, it is hoped that a deeper understanding of the dynamics between the executive and legislative branches within the framework of Indonesia's evolving constitutional system will be gained (Fadillah, 2022).

METHODS

This study uses a qualitative research approach to explore the dynamics between the executive and legislative branches within Indonesia's constitutional system. The main objective of this research is to examine the interactions, cooperation, and conflicts between these two branches of government, focusing on the factors that shape their relationship. Given the complex nature of political relationships, a qualitative approach is chosen as it allows for a deeper understanding of the intricate dynamics between the executive and legislative powers in Indonesia.

The research is designed as a case study analysis, specifically analyzing significant instances of collaboration and conflict between the executive and legislative branches. The cases selected for this study include major legislative processes such as the enactment of the Omnibus Law, budget negotiations, and political coalition formations. By investigating these cases, the study aims to identify the factors that influence the working relationship between the President and the DPR. Data for this research will be collected from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data will include interviews with political analysts, legal experts, and members of the executive and legislative branches, providing firsthand insight into the political dynamics and decision-making processes within these institutions. Secondary data will consist of government documents, official reports, legislative records, academic journals, and books that focus on Indonesian governance, constitutional law, and political science. These secondary sources will help contextualize the political events and decisions under examination and provide a broader theoretical framework.

To analyze the data, the study will employ thematic analysis, a method that identifies patterns and recurring themes within qualitative data. This analysis will focus on key themes such as power dynamics, political negotiations, policy formulation, and the role of political parties and coalitions in shaping executive-legislative interactions. The framework of separation of powers will also be applied to guide the analysis, drawing on the theoretical perspectives of scholars such as Montesquieu, who emphasized the importance of balanced power among the branches of government. This theoretical approach will be used to understand how power is distributed and exercised between the executive and legislative branches, and how conflicts

between these branches are resolved.

To ensure the validity and reliability of the research findings, triangulation will be employed by cross-referencing data from different sources, such as interviews, government documents, and academic literature. This approach will help corroborate the findings and ensure that the interpretations of the data are unbiased and comprehensive. The study will also maintain transparency by documenting the research process, allowing for future replication and validation of the results. Ethical considerations will be a key part of the study. All interviewees will give informed consent, and their anonymity and confidentiality will be maintained. Personal data will be handled with care, and any conflicts of interest will be disclosed to ensure ethical integrity in the research process.

Despite its comprehensive approach, this study acknowledges certain limitations. Being a qualitative study, it is limited in its ability to generalize the findings to the broader population of executive-legislative relations. Additionally, while the case study approach allows for an in-depth exploration of specific events, it may not capture every aspect of the executive-legislative dynamics across Indonesia's entire governance system. However, the cases selected are considered to be representative of the broader patterns in Indonesia's political system, and the insights gained will contribute to a better understanding of how the executive and legislative branches interact.

RESULTS & DISCUSSION

This section discusses the findings of the study, which focuses on the dynamics between the executive and legislative branches in Indonesia's constitutional system. It also explores how these findings are situated within theoretical frameworks and compares them with prior research to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the two branches.

The Relationship Between the Executive and Legislative Branches

One of the most significant findings of this study is the complex and often dynamic relationship between the executive (the President) and the legislative branch (the DPR). The conventional view, inspired by Montesquieu's model of separation of powers, posits that the executive and legislative branches should operate independently, with a system of checks and balances designed to prevent either branch from dominating the other. In theory, this model ensures that no branch becomes too powerful, thus safeguarding democratic governance. However, in the context of Indonesia's political system, the reality is somewhat different. While the Indonesian system nominally adheres to Montesquieu's vision, the relationship between the executive and legislative branches is characterized by interdependence, cooperation, and sometimes contentious negotiation, rather than strict separation. This nuanced relationship is more cooperative than competitive, with both branches recognizing that their mutual collaboration is often necessary to advance their respective policy agendas and secure the nation's governance (Sudirman, 2019).

In practice, Indonesia's system of government fosters an ongoing negotiation between the executive and the legislative branches. This negotiation is not merely about maintaining a balance of power but about effectively governing a diverse and politically fragmented nation. The interdependence between the two branches becomes particularly evident through coalition politics, which plays a critical role in Indonesia's parliamentary system. Due to Indonesia's multiparty political landscape, no single political party can achieve a majority on its own. As a result, after each election, political parties must form coalitions to secure legislative support for the President's policies. This situation reflects the inherent interdependency of the executive and legislative branches in Indonesia. The President must rely on the support of these coalitions, which are formed with varying interests, to pass important pieces of legislation. In turn, the President is often forced to negotiate, amend, and sometimes compromise on his or her original policy proposals to secure this legislative backing.

An illustrative example of this interdependence is the Omnibus Law, passed in 2020. This law, which aimed to simplify regulations to attract investment and improve the business climate in Indonesia, was a monumental piece of legislation that required significant cooperation between the executive and the legislative branches. Despite facing significant opposition from labor unions, environmental groups, and some political parties, the Omnibus Law was passed, demonstrating the executive's reliance on the legislative branch for support and approval. The passage of the law required extensive negotiations, strategic compromises, and lobbying efforts by the executive to align the diverse political interests within the DPR (Kartikasari, 2020). While this legislation was controversial, particularly due to its perceived negative impact on labor rights, its passage underscores the interdependent relationship between the executive and legislative branches, highlighting how the President cannot unilaterally enact such a transformative law without considerable legislative backing.

The study's findings echo those of previous research, particularly the work of Pramudya (2019), who pointed out that political coalitions are not just a tool for securing legislative support but also act as a mechanism that shapes the policymaking process itself. Pramudya noted that coalition politics fundamentally

alters the traditional separation of powers model, as it forces both the executive and legislative branches to negotiate, compromise, and collaborate on key issues. This dynamic reveals that the executive and legislative branches, while having distinct roles and powers, must work together to enact laws and policies that address the diverse needs and interests of Indonesian society. The executive, in particular, must often adjust its policies to accommodate the demands of coalition partners, which may include political parties with differing ideologies, regional interests, and priorities.

In the context of Indonesia, this interdependence also introduces new tensions and complexities into the political process. Although the President enjoys significant executive powers, including the authority to issue decrees and enact laws through executive orders, the legislative branch holds considerable sway over policy outcomes through its control of the budget, its oversight of government actions, and its role in lawmaking. As such, the executive is not entirely autonomous in its decision-making. Instead, the President must maintain a delicate balance of political alliances within the DPR to ensure the success of their policy initiatives. This reality challenges the traditional view of a completely separate executive-legislative relationship, as suggested by Montesquieu, and points to a more pragmatic approach in which power is balanced through negotiation, compromise, and collaboration.

Moreover, this interdependence underscores the importance of political stability and effective coalition management. The executive's ability to govern depends not only on its political mandate but also on its ability to forge and sustain coalitions that are supportive of its agenda. The intricate and sometimes volatile nature of these coalitions means that the relationship between the executive and legislative branches is constantly evolving. For example, shifts in party alliances, the introduction of new parties into the coalition, or changing public opinion can all impact the President's ability to secure legislative approval for key policies. As such, the President must engage in constant negotiation, both with political parties in the DPR and with public interest groups, to ensure that their legislative agenda remains viable.

This research also adds to the growing body of literature on the political dynamics of executive-legislative relations in Indonesia. Previous studies, such as those conducted by Widodo (2021), have suggested that the political system in Indonesia, while structured around a formal separation of powers, operates more effectively through pragmatic collaboration and compromise between the executive and legislative branches. These studies indicate that the executive and legislative branches are not isolated entities but are deeply connected through the mechanisms of coalition politics and inter-institutional negotiation. In turn, these mechanisms shape the policymaking process, often requiring the President and the DPR to find common ground despite ideological differences.

The findings of this study confirm that the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in Indonesia is characterized by interdependence and negotiation rather than a strict separation of powers. While the separation of powers model provides an important theoretical framework, the reality of Indonesian politics requires the executive and legislative branches to collaborate closely in the formulation and implementation of policies. The example of the Omnibus Law demonstrates how both branches must work together to pass significant legislation, while also navigating political tensions and competing interests. This dynamic relationship between the two branches is an essential feature of Indonesia's democratic system, highlighting the need for negotiation, compromise, and cooperation in the governance process.

The Role of Oversight and Accountability

Another key finding of this study is the central role that the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) plays in overseeing the executive branch, particularly in the areas of governance and resource allocation. Montesquieu's principle of checks and balances, which aims to prevent any single branch from becoming too powerful, is operationalized in Indonesia through the DPR's powers of oversight. The DPR's oversight extends across multiple areas, including the management of the state budget, government policy implementation, and the functioning of state-owned enterprises. This oversight function is vital to ensuring that the executive adheres to the principles of good governance, financial accountability, and transparency.

One of the most significant aspects of the DPR's oversight role is its involvement in the annual budget process. The Indonesian government's budget is one of the most important tools in shaping the country's policy agenda and determining how resources are allocated across various sectors. The DPR plays an active and influential role in scrutinizing the executive's budget proposals. Members of the DPR evaluate whether the executive's financial priorities align with national needs and public interests. They are empowered to suggest amendments, question expenditures, and, when necessary, demand changes to ensure that public funds are used effectively and efficiently. This power of scrutiny is essential in holding the executive accountable for its fiscal decisions, which directly affect the welfare of the people (Pramudya, 2019).

In addition to budgetary oversight, the DPR also exercises its authority to question and investigate the executive's actions across various other spheres. This includes scrutinizing the implementation of government policies, particularly those that involve the public sector, such as the administration of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The DPR has the right to request reports, summon government officials, and

demand explanations for any irregularities in government operations. This is especially important in the context of Indonesia's large public sector, where mismanagement or corruption could have severe consequences for the economy and public trust. For instance, if discrepancies arise in the financial management of an SOE, the DPR can investigate and take corrective action. The executive, in turn, must remain transparent in its dealings and justify its actions to the legislature, reinforcing the principles of accountability (Baharuddin, 2021).

The findings from this study are consistent with earlier research by Ardiansyah (2020), which demonstrated how legislative oversight acts as a critical mechanism for keeping the executive branch in check. Ardiansyah argued that legislative oversight not only ensures the executive's accountability but also reinforces democratic principles by giving the DPR the power to question and evaluate executive actions. This process allows the legislative body to provide a counterbalance to the concentration of executive power, thereby preventing potential abuses or mismanagement of authority. By holding the executive accountable, the DPR plays an indispensable role in maintaining the integrity of Indonesia's democratic system.

However, despite its formal authority, the DPR's oversight capacity is not always straightforward. The political dynamics within Indonesia's multi-party system often complicate the effectiveness of legislative oversight. The necessity of forming coalitions to support the President's agenda creates a situation where the DPR may face difficulties in fully exercising its oversight role. For instance, members of the DPR may be reluctant to challenge the executive if they are part of the ruling coalition or if they have political interests tied to the executive's success. Political loyalty, party allegiance, and coalition agreements can sometimes limit the DPR's ability to act independently and assertively in holding the executive accountable. This is particularly evident when the ruling party and its coalition partners control a significant portion of the DPR, making it harder for opposition members to influence the legislative agenda or force investigations into government misconduct (Sudirman, 2019).

This issue is compounded by the fact that coalition politics in Indonesia can often blur the lines between the executive and legislative branches. In some cases, the DPR may prioritize political stability over effective oversight, leading to compromises that undermine its ability to challenge the executive. For example, while the DPR may technically have the power to call for investigations or block certain government actions, the pursuit of party-political interests often takes precedence. This has led to criticisms that the DPR, despite its formal oversight powers, is sometimes reluctant to exercise these powers fully when political interests align too closely with the executive branch (Widodo, 2021). As a result, the effectiveness of the DPR's oversight is often contingent on the political context and the strength of the opposition parties.

Moreover, the political nature of coalition agreements can sometimes create conflicts of interest within the DPR itself. For instance, some coalition parties may be more inclined to protect the executive branch due to the benefits they gain from remaining in the ruling alliance. In this case, the political leverage that coalition members hold may prevent the DPR from fully exercising its authority over the executive, leading to a situation where political considerations outweigh the need for accountability. This phenomenon complicates the theoretical framework of checks and balances, as political compromises can dilute the capacity of the DPR to act as a meaningful check on executive power. As Kartikasari (2020) highlighted, the negotiation and compromise involved in coalition politics can sometimes weaken the DPR's role in effectively overseeing the executive, especially when partisan interests dominate legislative decision-making.

Despite these challenges, it is important to recognize that the DPR's role in oversight is still a crucial component of Indonesia's democratic system. The fact that the DPR, despite political constraints, continues to question and challenge the executive on important issues demonstrates the persistence of democratic principles. Furthermore, the DPR's oversight responsibilities are supported by institutional mechanisms such as the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), which provide additional checks on the executive's actions. These institutions, along with the DPR, form a broader system of checks and balances that helps to ensure transparency, accountability, and the responsible use of state resources.

In conclusion, while the DPR plays a critical role in overseeing the executive, the political dynamics within Indonesia's coalition-based system present both opportunities and challenges for the effective exercise of this oversight. The interplay between coalition politics and the need for legislative independence can sometimes undermine the DPR's ability to hold the executive accountable. Nevertheless, the DPR's oversight powers, particularly in the areas of budget allocation and public sector management, remain essential in safeguarding democratic governance and ensuring the proper functioning of Indonesia's political system. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for enhancing the effectiveness of legislative oversight and strengthening the system of checks and balances in Indonesia's evolving democracy.

Political Conflicts and Diverging Interests

This study also reveals that political conflicts and diverging interests frequently characterize the relationship between the executive and legislative branches, particularly when it comes to the formulation and implementation of public policy. Such conflicts are especially prominent in areas that directly affect the

public welfare, including economic planning, social protection programs, infrastructure development, and regional autonomy. These areas often become battlegrounds for competing visions of governance, with the executive and legislative bodies pushing different agendas based on their respective mandates and political affiliations.

One prominent example of these tensions is the ongoing debate surrounding regional autonomy. Since the implementation of decentralization policies in the early 2000s, regional autonomy has remained a contentious issue in Indonesian politics. The President, as the head of the executive, may seek to streamline governance and maintain control over national priorities by advocating for a more centralized administrative approach. This is often framed as a strategy to ensure uniform development, prevent regional disparities, and reduce inefficiencies. On the other hand, members of the DPR, who are elected to represent a diverse range of regional constituencies, often push for greater decentralization and increased authority for local governments. They argue that empowering local governments can lead to more responsive, context-specific solutions to public issues and strengthen democratic participation at the grassroots level (Fadillah, 2022).

This friction between centralization and decentralization is reflective of Indonesia's broader struggle to balance national unity with regional diversity. The post-Reformasi era ushered in greater democratization and a shift toward local empowerment, but it also introduced a complex web of intergovernmental relations that has not always been easy to navigate. The executive often emphasizes efficiency, control, and coherence in policy implementation, while the legislature stresses representativeness, inclusivity, and local responsiveness. These differing priorities can result in policy gridlock or the dilution of key initiatives during the legislative approval process, as compromises are sought to reconcile opposing views.

These dynamics align with the findings of Baharuddin (2021), who notes that policy disagreements between the executive and legislative bodies are not merely institutional but are deeply rooted in ideological, regional, and electoral considerations. The DPR, being composed of members from various political parties and regions, tends to be more attuned to localized interests and concerns. This sometimes puts it at odds with the executive, which is more focused on national-level policy frameworks. For example, when allocating budgets for infrastructure projects, the DPR may push for regionally distributed funds to satisfy constituent demands, while the executive may prefer concentrating resources on projects deemed to have nationwide strategic value.

Additionally, political ideology and party alignment further complicate this relationship. While the President may enjoy a certain level of support from a coalition of parties in the DPR, not all members of the legislature will share the same policy priorities. Diverging party platforms, especially between opposition parties and the ruling coalition, can result in resistance to executive proposals, delays in legislative approval, or calls for revisions that significantly alter the substance of proposed policies. This can be seen in cases where the DPR has demanded significant changes to proposed laws on taxation, labor reform, or environmental policy, citing concerns from regional actors or civil society groups.

Moreover, these political disagreements are not purely antagonistic; they also reflect the institutional design of Indonesia's democratic system, which encourages negotiation and compromise. However, in practice, this often leads to prolonged debates and inefficiencies in decision-making. For example, the process of passing major legislative initiatives such as the National Capital City (IKN) relocation or omnibus economic laws involves lengthy negotiations, committee reviews, and revisions to address divergent interests. While this process is a hallmark of democratic deliberation, it can also slow down the government's ability to respond swiftly to urgent national challenges.

The challenges of political conflict are also magnified by the nature of Indonesia's multi-party system. With numerous parties represented in the DPR, forming and maintaining stable legislative coalitions is a continuous political effort. As Kartikasari (2020) suggests, these coalitions are often pragmatic rather than ideological, meaning they are vulnerable to shifts in political loyalty, especially during high-stakes policy negotiations. In such an environment, the executive must invest significant political capital to secure legislative backing, often making concessions that dilute policy effectiveness or coherence. This dynamic reflects a delicate balancing act between governance efficiency and political accommodation.

In some instances, the clash of interests has led to institutional tensions that spill over into the public sphere, drawing criticism from media and civil society. When the DPR, for instance, appears to block or delay reforms supported by the executive, it may be perceived as obstructive or driven by self-interest. Conversely, when the executive pushes through controversial policies without sufficient legislative consultation, it risks being seen as authoritarian or dismissive of democratic checks and balances. These public perceptions further influence the political behavior of both branches and can escalate conflicts if not managed through effective communication and negotiation.

Despite these conflicts, it is important to recognize that such tensions are a normal and even necessary feature of a functioning democratic system. As argued by Pramudya (2019), the presence of institutional friction can serve as a safeguard against unilateral decision-making and foster more inclusive policymaking. When managed constructively, these disagreements can lead to policies that are better informed by diverse

perspectives and more broadly supported by the public. However, when left unresolved or driven by political maneuvering rather than substantive debate, they can undermine the effectiveness and legitimacy of government action.

Implications for Indonesian Governance

The findings of this study suggest that Indonesia's system of government, while formally grounded in the principle of separation of powers, is better understood as a dynamic interplay of cooperation, negotiation, and compromise between the executive and legislative branches. Although the theoretical framework of separation of powers—as articulated by Montesquieu—emphasizes the independence of each governmental branch to avoid concentration of power, the Indonesian context reveals a more nuanced and interdependent relationship. This interdependence is not merely a deviation from the ideal model but rather a necessary adaptation within a political system characterized by diverse interests, a multi-party structure, and regional plurality.

The collaborative relationship between the executive and the legislature has proven vital for effective policy formulation and implementation. In a highly fragmented political environment where coalitions are often formed based on pragmatic, rather than ideological, grounds, the executive cannot act unilaterally. Presidential authority, while strong in formal terms, is often contingent on support from the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat). This creates a governance model where negotiation is not just strategic but essential. Policies such as the Omnibus Law and the National Capital Relocation Project are examples of how political collaboration, despite being contentious, has become a key component of decision-making processes. This cooperative approach enables the government to accommodate diverse viewpoints, which is crucial in a country as socially, culturally, and geographically varied as Indonesia.

At the same time, this study underscores the double-edged nature of such cooperation. While political compromise fosters inclusion and consensus-building, it can also lead to policy stagnation, diluted reforms, or even the prioritization of political expediency over long-term national interests. In some cases, compromises made to maintain coalition stability may sacrifice the quality of governance, as seen when critical legislation is fast-tracked without sufficient public consultation to appease coalition partners. This raises concerns about transparency and accountability, which are essential for a healthy democracy. Thus, while interdependence between the executive and legislature can enhance governance responsiveness, it also demands strong institutional safeguards to ensure that accountability and democratic integrity are not undermined in the process.

Furthermore, the study's findings have significant implications for the design and operation of checks and balances within Indonesia's democratic framework. Oversight mechanisms by the DPR are an essential counterweight to executive authority, especially in areas such as budget allocations, public procurement, and large-scale development programs. However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms depends heavily on the independence of the legislature, which in turn is influenced by internal party dynamics, coalition alignments, and political will. Strengthening the institutional capacity of the DPR, including its research capabilities, ethical standards, and transparency measures, would enhance its ability to perform its oversight function more effectively.

From a broader perspective, the implications of this study highlight the importance of cultivating a political culture that values dialogue, compromise, and democratic engagement. As Indonesia continues to navigate issues such as corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, economic inequality, and regional disparities, the ability of its democratic institutions to manage conflict constructively becomes even more critical. A robust and resilient democracy is not defined by the absence of disagreement, but by the ability of its institutions to resolve conflicts in a manner that upholds justice, inclusiveness, and the rule of law.

The findings also suggest that public understanding and civic participation are essential in shaping the evolution of executive-legislative relations. When citizens are informed and engaged, they can serve as an additional check on power, pushing both the executive and legislature toward greater accountability and responsiveness. Civil society organizations, academic institutions, and the media all play important roles in fostering transparency and encouraging informed public discourse on matters of governance.

Looking forward, this study implies that reform efforts should focus not solely on adjusting formal institutional structures, but also on improving the quality of interaction between the executive and legislative bodies. This includes encouraging internal democratization within political parties, enhancing legislative deliberation processes, and institutionalizing practices that promote inter-branch communication and cooperation. The development of standardized policy coordination mechanisms, joint policy planning sessions, and bipartisan legislative forums may offer practical pathways for improving the efficacy of executive-legislative relations.

CONCLUSION

This study reveals that Indonesia's system of governance operates less as a strict application of the separation of powers and more as a fluid and interdependent relationship between the executive and legislative branches. While the Constitution outlines distinct roles for each branch, the realities of coalition politics, party dynamics, and regional representation require ongoing negotiation and collaboration. This cooperation, although often marked by tension and compromise, is essential for achieving policy consensus and ensuring the stability of governance in a diverse and decentralized nation like Indonesia.

This interdependence also presents challenges, particularly in maintaining accountability, transparency, and the quality of legislation. Political compromises made to secure coalition support can sometimes weaken democratic oversight or prioritize short-term political interests over long-term national goals. Therefore, strengthening institutional safeguards, promoting legislative independence, and encouraging meaningful public participation are crucial steps toward enhancing the effectiveness and integrity of Indonesia's democratic system.

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